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CANES IMPLEMENTATION: ANALYSIS OF BUDGETARY, 






To reduce cost and effectively manage afloat networks, the Navy is adopting current 
industry best practices, including the use of a common computing environment and open 
architecture. The Consolidated Afloat Network Enterprise System (CANES) was 
designed to employ these frameworks. CANES will combine five existing shipboard 
networks by utilizing commercial-off-the-shelf hardware and software. The use of 
CANES is expected to reduce overall cost by eliminating redundant information 
technology infrastructure and migrating to service-oriented architecture. 
This report focuses on acquisition strategy and policy, technological influences, 
and economic factors that could affect the ongoing implementation process of the 
CANES program. These factors directly impact the decisions being made in fielding the 
application of CANES. An analysis of these approaches in the context of these factors 
shows a negative effect of deficit-driven budgeting on schedule and performance. 
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The Navy is facing a dramatic culture shift with the adoption of the Consolidated 
Afloat Network Enterprise System (CANES). The use of commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) hardware and software and civilian-type open architecture (OA) presents a series 
of challenges. The purpose of this report is to provide the Navy with a multifaceted body 
of knowledge on how the information systems (IS) acquisitions process works. The 
current approaches, program management, requirements, and budgeting will be analyzed 
in the context of CANES.  
 
Figure 1.  Evolution of CANES (from Program Executive Office, Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence [PEO C4I], 
2014) 
The CANES effort arose from the lack of integration of the large number of 
networks aboard ships. Each network required specialized training and unique support 
aspects. As a result, maintenance was difficult and costly. Figure 1 shows the five legacy 
networks that have been merged into one architecture. A principal goal of CANES was to 
have flexible shipboard networks that could be easily adapted by platforms with reduced 
maintenance and costs. To achieve this goal, civilian commercial entities began 
transitioning from hardware- and software-oriented architecture to a more service-
oriented architecture by using virtualization and other applications. The CANES program 
is the transference and repurposing of common computing architecture for use in 
nontactical afloat systems (Riposo, Gordon, Murphy, Wilson & Porche, 2012). Figure 2 
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shows what the hardware setup will have a less complex design, aboard an Arleigh Burke 
Class Destroyer when CANES is implemented.  
 
Figure 2.  Depiction of an Arleigh Burke class destroyer network (from PEO 
C4I, 2014) 
 
Figure 3.  Architecture (from PEO C4I, 2014) 
The Navy’s approach for application integration (and eventually the way-forward 
strategy for cloud architecture) is called the common computing environment (CCE). The 
Tactical Networks Directorate, PEO C41, aims to use the CCE to consolidate legacy 
network configurations into one a unified hardware and software environment. Figure 3 
shows the notional hardware configuration for CANES aboard an Arleigh Burke-class 
Destroyer. Additionally, the CCE will become the standard by which applications and 
systems are developed for future use and integration.  
The CCE standard would have a profound effect on the methods used to analyze, 
integrate, test, and certify applications or systems. Proposed changes will be scrutinized 
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by their potential to affect existing system resources. A virtualized CCE would be utilized 
to test any new server-hosted application. Configuration shortfalls that result in interface 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Currently, the CANES technical strategy makes heavy use of COTS software and 
hardware. The goal within CANES is to refresh software design every two years and 
hardware every four years in an attempt to maintain pace with developments in the 
civilian industry. Rapid technological growth coupled with the highly competitive nature 
of the civilian technology industry could render the CANES business strategy 
unattainable.  
A. TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH THEORY  
In a paper published in 1965, Gordon E. Moore documented the number of 
transistors in an integrated circuit. He drew data from the known history of computer 
hardware and noticed that the number of transistors seemed to double every two years 
(Moore, 1965). While Moore’s paper focused solely on densely integrated circuits, the 
application of Moore’s research has been expanded by academics and industry 
practitioners alike. Moore’s Law is not a traditional scientific law but an observation that 
has been a widely used framework. Over the years, Moore’s Law has become an 
estimating and planning tool in the semiconductor industry. To stay competitive in the 
market, research and development efforts have subsequently been tailored to meet two-
year objectives. The law has also been expanded to describe other trends within the 
computer industry, such as memory capacity, pixel size and resolution, and 
microprocessor costs.  
 6 
 
Figure 4.  Moore’s Law (from Schaller, 2002) 
Figure 4 shows the linear growth of the number of transistor components through 
four decades. Since many technologies are related to circuit densities, the acceleration or 
deceleration of the growth rate could have widespread implications. Technology 
professionals believe the trend will slow; claiming that the transistor counts will double 
over the years starting this decade, or that the trend will stop completely (McMillan, 
2014; Tuomi, 2002). 
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B. QUALITY-ADJUSTED PRICE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
EQUIPMENT 
Moore’s Law has been used to describe a relationship of time and advancement in 
technology. This same principle can be used to depict a general trend in price versus 
technological performance over time as circuit manufacturing evolved.  
 
Figure 5.  Cost of IT: 1960 to present 
(from Economic Research: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
2014) 
Figure 5 shows the investment in IT equipment from 1960 through 2010, roughly 
the same amount of time Moore’s Law has been in existence. The x-axis shows the 
macroeconomic level of spending represented by a chained price index. This basket-of-
goods measure is meant to show how much is spent for certain products being purchased, 
and then the figure is adjusted for inflation and performance.  
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The analysis shows a dramatic decrease prices from the early 1960s to the 1980s. 
The same level of commercial computing power that would have cost almost half a 
million dollars in 1960 cost less than 100 dollars two decades later.  
 
Figure 6.  Cost of IT: 1990–2000 
(from Economic Research: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
2014) 
Figure 6 shows an average annual decrease in the chain price index of sixty 
percent in the 1990s. This statistic translated into prices decreasing by approximately half 
every nine months versus the typical twenty-four months. Although Moore’s Law was 
initially an observation that was used as a forecasting tool, it became widely accepted and 
started serving as an unwritten industry standard. 
C. CANES CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The interplay of business, technical, and operational needs is a balancing act. The 
CANES program should be analyzed from the perspective of each area to understand 
what drives the dialogue and eventual decision making. Figure 7 shows the major drivers 
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in the CANES concept of operation. Operational necessity, broadly defined in terms of 
afloat networks, is the ability to have “anytime, anywhere” communications and available 
technology (Burbank & Kasch, 2004). Embedded within operational necessity are 
subelements like manpower, maintenance and scheduling, and training, all of which are 
necessary for the effective deployment of a system. From the technical standpoint, 
CANES makes heavy use of COTS hardware and software and is essentially the next 
iteration of military networks that has slowly gravitated from system-oriented 
architecture and proprietary technology. Finally, CANES is a product of both industry 
and military best practices. Acquisition and contracting strategy have also played vital 
roles in the business-process fielding of the CANES system. 
 
Figure 7.  CANES concept of operations 
(after Bass & Mabry, 2004; PEO C4I, 2014; Wilson, 2007) 
1. Operational Needs  
Removing communication as an operational constraint is the ultimate goal of any 
network program (Burbank & Kasch, 2004). CANES is just one of many 
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communications technologies that works to achieve this aim. The overall strategic-level 
guidance that determines the concept of operations for system architects is the net-centric 
warfare (NCW) paradigm (Wilson, 2007). This paradigm is all inclusive of what a 
network should be, addressing the top-down requirement from strategic to tactical and the 
joint interoperability concerns across all services (Burbank & Kasch, 2004).  
The key to understanding the overall NCW concept and intent of CANES is the 
approach of the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) methodology towards networks. 
Today’s operational frameworks are still based on two regional conventional war 
scenarios (Cebrowski, & Garstka, 1998). This mindset has dominated national strategy, 
diplomacy, and, inevitably, procurement. How digital information is used in theatre, 
therefore, has been shaped by this larger overarching strategy. 
Recent history, however, has been marked by nontraditional threats. The global 
war on terror has shifted the focus away from conventional warfare to more diffused and 
stateless counterinsurgency (Wilson, 2007). These two paradigms—conventional and 
nontraditional warfare—tempered by the realities of security, efficiency, scalability, and 
cost, are the genesis of CANES and all other network-consolidation efforts (PEO C4I, 
2014). 
Also shaping operational capability is shipboard manpower employment and 
priority of needs. Aboard ships, the manpower size is determined by the ship’s 
capabilities, mission, and required watches; therefore, certain watch stations and 
shipboard systems take precedence over routine maintenance and upkeep. Fielding the 
CANES system was meant to reduce the necessary manpower required to sustain 
networks. An analysis of the personnel and training requirements is required to 
understand the ownership cost of the system. Ratings (electronics technician and 
information systems technician) are assigned to the maintenance of network and 
information. A number of institutional barriers currently stand in the way of the optimal 
training and manning model to support CANES. A consolidated and efficiently designed 
network would require a dedicated skill set for system maintenance and operability but 
would free up extra personnel to fulfill other jobs and positions aboard ships (Thie, 
Harrell, McCarthy, & Jenkins, 2009). 
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2. Technical 
Though computer networks have their origins in defense applications, the civilian 
commercial sector has dominated the field for decades. Successful net-centric operations 
in future conflicts could be contingent upon closing the technical performance gap 
between commercial and military network technologies. From the business standpoint, 
any technology that results in faster integration and improved agility brings an increase in 
return on investment (Datz, 2004).  
Industry consortiums have set standards with little to no input from the DOD 
sector, resulting in a mismatch of applicable uses for COTS software and devices in DOD 
environments. Without a dramatic increase in DOD participation in the standards process, 
the likely long-term network solution will be a mixture of COTS and military 
components (Burbank & Kasch, 2004).  
Network requirements discussions should take into account the concept of quality 
of service (QOS). QOS is the result of tradeoffs that must occur due to network speed and 
throughput constraints. QOS consists of three categories: hard real-time, soft real-time, 
and non-real-time scheduling. Hard real-time is the scheduling required for targeting or 
air-traffic control. Soft real-time is when momentary network outages or degradation of 
service quality occur; it is not considered catastrophic, such as voice or video 
communications would be. Non-real-time would be Web browsing, for example, where 
degradations in service would not translate into a catastrophe or loss of life. The degree 
of QOS will dictate how an enterprise’s architecture is designed and whether it is 
federated and net-centric or integrated and system-centric (Bass & Mabry, 2004). Figure 
8 shows how the capabilities of the U.S. and adversaries are affected given their level of 
dependence on COTS technology. 
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Figure 8.  U.S. military network capability (after Burbank & Kasch, 2004) 
3. Business 
The effects of the 2013 sequestration, government shutdown, and deferred or 
cancelled ship availabilities all impacted the program schedule (Seligman, 2014). For 
years the military has fielded communications systems based on proprietary technology, a 
process which has had long-term cost and performance ramifications. (Burbank & Kasch, 
2004). An overly complex IS-type business plan is subject to slow execution; issues that 
could arise include technology obsolescence, funding instability, immaterial training, and 
disproportionate manpower distribution (Thie, et al. 2009). 
The design refresh goals for CANES software and hardware are two and four 
years, respectively; for fielding, the goals are four and eight years. The regulatory and 
operational environment often precludes CANES refresh efforts at a cost to the Navy. 
The processes associated with vetting and approving an update to CANES can run in 
excess of several years. When this timeline is placed side by side with Moore’s Law–
related phenomena, CANES is simply outpaced. Suppliers of the CANES hardware and 
software maintain a rapid rate of innovation and fielding to stay competitive in the 
market. Generally, this practice drives prices lower and performance higher. CANES 
could not take advantage of either the lower prices or the high performance given the 
slow bureaucratic practices internal to the Navy, the acquisition community, or shipyards. 
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4. Contracting  
The average age of a typical Navy shipboard network is about seven years, which 
is considerably longer than the average nominal refresh rate of the COTS networks. 
When ships typically receive new network systems, the hardware and software is already 
three to four years behind the industry’s most current technology. In an attempt to rectify 
this disparity, the Navy typically amends the installation contracts to allow for upgrades. 
This procedure normally equates to purchasing the most current hardware and software 
packages that will meet or exceed the necessary system specifications and are compatible 
with the existing systems. This process is inefficient and in some cases could cost the 
Navy double what the cost should have been. The CANES contracting plan was 
developed through lessons learned and follows a flexible and agile contracting strategy 
(Riposo, Gordon IV, Murphy, Wilson, & Porche, 2012).  
5. Funding 
Funding uncertainty is prevalent in many major automated information systems. 
With the CANES program now in the initial stages of production, near-term funding 
priorities have shifted to full rate procurement, operations, and maintenance. The 
assumptions that drive the allocation of procurement and maintenance dollars must be 
analyzed. No program is completely insulated by the effects of macroeconomic swings or 
shifting political priorities. The defense-wide trend of reducing operations and maintenance 
funding could have a profound impact on the overall CANES business strategy.  
 14 
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III. DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS BUSINESS PRACTICES 
Three policy entities govern U.S. military procurement: the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process, the Joint Capabilities 
Integration Development System (JCIDS), and the Defense Acquisitions System (DAS) 
(DODI 5000.02). Each serves to deliver capability to the warfighter in the most 
expeditious and cost effective means possible by achieving the optimal balance between 
the driving factors of needs, events, and schedule. Figure 9 shows each decision support 
system and their corresponding guidance documents. Each provides checks and balances 
between the others’ power so as not to field a system that lacks capability, is 
unsustainable in the long term, or may be cost prohibitive. In the case of CANES and 
defense computing networks at large, the acquisition policy has served as an institutional 
barrier that exposes programs to greater risk. 
 
Figure 9.  DOD major decision making Process 
(from Defense Aquisition Guidebook, 2010) 
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A. DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
In the DOD, IS are acquired through the use of the Defense Acquisitions System. 
DAS manages the nation’s investments in technologies, programs, and products 
necessary to achieve the National Security Strategy and support the U.S. Armed Forces. 
In a timely manner and at a fair and reasonable price, DAS must acquire quality products 
that meet or exceed user needs with measurable improvements to mission capability and 
operations support (Department of Defense, 2003).  
 
Figure 10.  Systems engineering quality construct 
(after Department of Defense, 2008) 
Figure 10 represents the quality-of-goods triangle; two of the three items may be 
had at a cost to the third item. For instance, a quality product or service that performs 
well and is completed within schedule may be obtained, but the cost will most likely be 
high. 
1. Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) of 1996  
The 1996 CCA was designed to streamline the way the federal government 
managed IT. Signed as part of the National Defense Act of the 1996 fiscal year (FY), the 
CCA placed regulatory oversight and assigned responsibility for IT investments to the 
director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (Defense Aquisition 
Guidebook, 2010). The CCA also established by law that each federal department appoint 
a chief information officer (CIO) who would work with the director of OMB as the 
departmental oversight for interoperability, security, and applicability of IT for their 
mission areas (Defense Aquisition Guidebook, 2010). 
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a. Department of Defense Chief Information Officer  
The DOD CIO was formally stood up when the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Network Information and Integration (NII) was officially disestablished in 2012 and all 
responsibilities transferred to the CIO (About DOD CIO, n.d). CIOs are overall 
responsible for providing standards of IT systems throughout the DOD, including the 
development, maintenance, implementation, and compliance with the DOD Information 
Enterprise (Department of Defense, 2009).  
b. Director of the Office of Management and Budget  
The director of the OMB is responsible for improving federal programs through 
acquisition, use, and disposal of IT systems by ensuring that all major IT systems are 
properly fielded for relevance, effectiveness, and applicability (AcqNotes, 2014).  
B. JOINT CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM 
 The JCIDS, set in place by Secretary Rumsfeld, provides the capabilities needed 
to perform globally, eliminate duplication of effort, and allow easier adaptability of new 
technology across all branches of the military. Under the old requirements schema, all 
weapons systems were developed solely within their service with little regard to 
interoperability and the warfighting doctrine of the other services. The end result was 
either costly redundancy or major capability gaps. A comparison of the old and new 
requirements process is shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.  Comparison of old schema and new JCIDS  
(after Department of Defense, 2008) 
The new system espouses a “born joint” philosophy toward requirements 
development. Service chiefs and combatant commanders are expected to review and 
revise requirements before acquisition approval to ensure the need is valid and the right 
system is ultimately built. Future systems are evaluated against their ability to meet 
missions across the board. The interplay between the stakeholders presumably refines the 
overall requirement, even if the requirement eventually translates into a service- or 
platform-specific system such as CANES (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 2012).  
C. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING AND EXECUTION (PPBE) 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara first introduced the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) during the Vietnam War; this system 
established a means of resource-driven decision making. In 2001 the DOD changed its 
business practice and required the use of a combined programming and budgeting phase. 
The new system was called PPBE; Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution; 
and its methodology serves as a way of streamlining and effectively managing the 
process of financial resource allocation (Department of Defense, 2013a). The PPBE 
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process is by no means insulated; Congressional pressure and infighting have made the 
process rough for many programs.  
For CANES, budget execution has been met with little pressure. Budget 
reduction, in the form of committee marks, has amounted to roughly $90 million. The 
CANES program office engages in periodic “what-if” drills based on major budgetary 
shifts. According to a Government Accountability Office (2013) report, these practices 
have substantially reduced program risk. 
1. Deficit-Driven Policy 
National strategy has been largely affected by public perceptions of the war and 
recent economic hardship. These realities have been reflected in the procurement 
decisions of legislators and service chiefs (Department of Defense, 2013b).  
a. Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 
 
Figure 12.  Projected costs of DOD’s plans and the BCA caps before and after 
automatic reductions (from Congressional Budget Office, 2013) 
The Budget Control Act (BCA) was written in response to domestic political 
pressure over the deteriorating state of the economy. Attention shifted from the Global 
War on Terror when intended effects of the 2007 Iraq troop surge were beginning to 
materialize (Woodard, 2008). A growing percentage of the American people viewed the 
War on Terror as a drain on the national treasure. The public outcry against Wall Street 
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mismanagement and cross-sector “bubble bursts” and government bailouts had overtaken 
the headlines, and legislators were primed to react. Over the years, the DOD has been 
sensitive to these types of economic realities and has aligned its strategy accordingly. 
Terms like “fiscal rebalancing” and “spending efficiency” have been used to describe the 
latest budgetary approach (Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management & 
Comptroller, 2014; Department of Defense, 2013b). Figure 13 shows the growing gap 
between what is budgeted according to the BCA and what is required to fund the Defense 
Department’s planned posture. 
The BCA of 2011 requires the Defense Department to reduce spending by $487 
billion over ten years. Some estimates predict the sequestration mechanism built into the 
bill could reduce annual spending by up to another $50 billion (Department of Defense, 
2013a; Department of Defense, 2013b). 
 
Figure 13.  Operations and maintenance funding, Navy 2012–2014 
(from Department of Defense, 2013b) 
Figure 13 shows the overall decrease of operations and maintenance funding. 
While the topline numbers show an increasing trend, the drastic reduction and eventual 
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disappearance of overseas contingency operations funding bring the total figures down. 
The request only covers 80% of the operations and maintenance required for that fiscal 
year.  
b. Sequestration  
The BCA contains a sequestration mechanism written into its language. 
Sequestration amounts to the cancellation of funding if a budget is not passed with 
funding below certain caps. In testimony to the House Armed Service’s Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, Sean Stackley (assistant secretary of the Navy for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) warns of the consequences of sequestration.  
If sequestration occurs, automatic percentage cuts are required to be 
applied without regard to strategy, importance, or priorities, resulting in 
adverse impact to almost every contract and procurement effort within the 
Department. Sequestration would adversely impact the Navy’s ability to 
procure the shipbuilding programs programmed in the FY2013 
Department of the Navy President’s Budget request. Potential reductions 
to the number of ships procured or stretch-outs to the programs of record 
will cause cost increases and create shortfalls or delays to ship deliveries, 
thus impacting the operating forces ability to meet its requirements. (p 1) 
The reductions in dollars for modernization translated into a reduction in CANES 
installations. In 2013, the Navy was able to achieve only eight installations instead of the 
15 that were planned for that fiscal year (Serbu, Sequestration Slows Network 
Modernization That the Navy Can’t Wait For, 2013). Without a budget to support a 
training and deployment cycle as outlined in the Optimized-Fleet Response Plan, 
maintenance periods in the CANES system are jeopardized. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF APPROACHES 
A. OPEN ARCHITECTURE 
The acquisition strategy for CANES is open architecture. The methodology of OA 
is designed to reduce risk and total ownership cost (Guertin & Clements, 2010). Figure 
14 shows a comparison of a traditional closed architecture to a new open architecture. 
Development under the old model was characterized by multiple funding streams and 
nonexistent technology. The capability gaps, therefore, needed to be filled by technology 
grown in-house at an additional cost to the program.  
 
Figure 14.  Open architecture concept (from Guertin & Clements, 2010) 
An often-referenced case regarding open systems in U.S. Navy acquisition is the 
successful development of Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) (Guertin & 
Clements, 2010). The same premise of decoupling hardware from software was a key 
component to the ARCI methodology. Moreover, ARCI underscored the feasibility of 
using COTS technology, this translated into overall expenditure avoidance in the form of 
software reuse and reduced downtime and maintenance requirements. Most importantly, 
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ARCI’s successful fielding using an open systems architecture and COTS technology 
significantly reduced cycle time (Boudreau, 2006). 
CANES leverages existing commercial technology, moving away from military-
specific hardware and software requirements to baselines more in sync with the 
commercial sector (Serbu, Navy Says CANES Network Is 44 Percent Cheaper Than 
Expected, 2012). 
B. NET-CENTRIC WARFARE  
While JCIDS provides the process for building requirements, the general 
philosophy that has governed the fielding of military information technology is grounded 
in net-centric warfare. The notion of NCW does not imply a purely offensive or defensive 
posture. The theoretical framework for many of the IT efforts in the DOD have been 
founded in this set of beliefs first authored in the late 1990s. In some ways, NCW is an 
extension of many of the technologically driven phenomena experienced in the latter half 
of the twentieth century. Computer networks have had a profound effect on business and 
society, so the way of war would naturally follow suit. VADM Arthur Cebrowski 
classifies NCW as a “revolution in military affairs (Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998).”  
The overall operational necessity for a networked battle space is to decrease 
decision cycle time and allow forces to more precisely align themselves according to the 
commander’s intent (Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998). The theory of NCW is to use 
technology to facilitate the communication of information to overcome the fog of war 
(Wilson, 2007).  
CANES, tempered by the realities of cybersecurity, the growing necessity for cost 
avoidance, and the rapid pace of technological advancement, is the next iteration of the 
afloat Navy’s information system. While the requirements process could be time-
consuming, building a system that is valid and verifiable in the acquisitions context is 
crucial. A valid system addresses the question: did we build the right thing? The CANES 
concept is consistent with the basic tenets of NCW, namely helping to remove digital 
communication as an operational restraint. In terms of system verification, CANES 
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continuously means to reduce cost by reducing hardware and software redundancy and 
the associated training and manpower requirements (Thie, et al. 2009).  
C. DEFENSE BUDGETING 
The financial resources required to successfully sustain programs is constantly 
under threat. From 2009 to 2014, the overall defense budget has contracted substantially 
because of the drawdown of hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. In that same time span, 
Congress has passed legislation in response to the domestic fiscal situation. For FY2014, 
the Defense Department requested $526 billion. At one point, in 2011, this number 
bordered $700 billion (Walker, 2014).  
Of the three decision-making entities in defense acquisition, perhaps the most 
visible is the budgeting—the PPBE—process. Whereas the requirements and program 
management processes exist in relative insulation, budgeting is subject to more debate 
and is sensitive to external factors. The CANES program is funded directly by two 
appropriations: (1) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and (2) other 
procurement. The appendix provides a budget exhibit from the Navy Financial 
Management and Comptroller Office that shows the amount research and procurement 
funding requested in the president’s budget for FY2014.  
1. Recent Budget Trends 
Larger trends in the budget have had profound effects on the ability to execute the 
CANES strategy. The end of hostilities in Iraq and the drawdown of forces in 
Afghanistan have affected the U.S. defense budget with a general reduction of funding 
impacting the appropriations to different degrees. The effect is amplified because 
weapons and systems are much more complex than they were in the past. There is an 
inextricable link between a system and the manpower, training, and logistical support 
must be in place to support the system. A change in one funding stream, therefore, could 
have unforeseen consequences. Figure 15 shows the percentage breakdown of each major 
appropriation for FY2014. 
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Figure 15.  Defense appropriations by percentage of total budget FY2014 
(after Congressional Budget Office, 2013) 
2. Military Personnel  
The military personal appropriation goes to pay service members and cover 
related expenses, such as housing, subsistence, and costs related to transferring duty 
stations (Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, 2013). The 
appropriation has grown the most from 2001 through 2014; nearly 46% since 2000. This 
growth is due mostly to Operational Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) troop mobilization (Congressional Budget Office, n.d.).  
3. Operation and Maintenance  
To support deployed troops, the operation and maintenance appropriation also 
grew. Operations and maintenance funding, also referred to as O&M, provides for the 
day-to-day costs associated with training and deployment of personnel and for costs 
associated with maintaining equipment (Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, 
Technology & Logistics, 2013). O&M funding goes to paying contractors and civilian 
employees in contrast to uniformed personnel who are paid through the personnel 
appropriation.  
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4. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
Also known as RDT&E, this appropriation fund covers the expense related to 
developing and refining future technology (Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, 
Technology & Logistics, 2013).  
This appropriation is constantly under threat of being cut by policymakers. 
Sometimes considered as “low-hanging fruit,” RDT&E budgets often come under 
scrutiny. Efforts to cut research funding are not met with as much opposition as proposed 
cuts to personnel or operations and maintenance; consequently, the RDT&E accounts are 
targeted when an immediate reduction is required. The CANES program is in the early 
stages of full rate initial production, with full-up-round systems now operational on the 
USS MCCAMPBELL and the USS MILIUS. A system in this stage will experience a 
shift in the proportion of its budget away from RDT&E to procurement.  
5. Procurement  
Whereas the personnel and O&M appropriations are considered expense accounts, 
procurement is viewed as an investment. With the exception of ship construction, which 
lasts five years, all procurement funding lasts a total of three years. This characteristic 
provides more flexibility and stability in execution over that of expense-type funding that 
must be renewed annually (Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology & 
Logistics, 2013). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In the CANES environment, the program office executes the overall acquisition 
strategy. Whereas the financial resources and technical requirements come from the 
PPBE and JCIDS, respectively, the acquisitions process translates those requirements and 
resources into operational capability. The CANES program office is the primary interface 
between resource and requirements entities and partners in industry who physically 
design and build the system. Installation, maintenance, and life-cycle support for CANES 
is managed through the program office (Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, 
Technology & Logistics, 2013). 
This project provides an analysis of the current acquisition approaches shaping 
the CANES program. The defense acquisition community has tried many tailored 
methodologies when fielding an information system such as CANES. Defense 
information technology has been outpaced by the commercial sector due to a time-
intensive and unwieldy acquisition process.  
The CANES system is a product of the competing demands implicit in the 
acquisition process. Separation of function within the process ensures a balance between 
cost, performance, and schedule. The relationship of these elements can be detailed in the 
decision-making structure that supports the CANES acquisition; JCIDS, PPBE and the 
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Table 1.   Approaches and drivers in acquisition decision making 
(after Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 2012; Congressional Budget 
Office, n.d; Guertin & Clements, 2010; Under Secretary of Defense, 
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, 2013; Wilson, 2007) 
A. REQUIREMENTS  
Delivering capability to the warfighter first begins with defining requirements. 
The traditional bottom-up approach of formulating requirements yielded systems that are 
service specific and tied to proprietary technology. Life-cycle support, therefore, became 
costly and complex. With the inception of the JCIDS process, programs were “born 
joint.” Interoperability with other services and integration with existing systems became 
the key parameters by which performance was assessed (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
2012; Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, 2013). 
CANES is consistent with the strategic visions put forth in NCW and CCA. With 
respect to NCW, CANES helps to remove communications as an operation limitation. 
The consolidation aspect of CANES makes networks easier to manage and less costly to 
maintain, which makes it consistent with the language of the CCA (Wilson, 2007). 
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B. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
The responsibility of the Program Office is to manage the technical design, 
logistical support, testing and fielding of the system. Driving many of the activities of the 
program office is schedules. While the Program Office is also responsible for the efficient 
use of financial assets in the form of its own budget, its main goal is to deliver the 
capability on time. Statutory requirements and a series of reviews ensure that a system is 
valid and verifiable in the acquisition context.  
IT scholars and practitioners have long observed the rapid growth of technology; 
applying these growth concepts to a variety of fields and sectors. Research and 
development timelines, cost projections, and marketing strategies have all been, to some 
degree, aligned to the two-year time-performance construct posited by Gordon Moore in 
the mid-1960s. The effect of this rapid growth was met by the acquisition community 
with eagerness (Department of Defense, 2013b). Best practices from industry were 
quickly incorporated into the DOD and Navy’s IT acquisition strategy. Beginning with 
programs like ARCI, the Navy has leveraged COTS hardware and software when feasible 
(Boudreau, 2006). The CANES acquisition strategy continues this COTS effort, 
expanding its application to a common computing environment known commercially as 
“Cloud Computing.” 
C. BUDGETING 
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have driven defense budgeting from 2001 
through 2014. A global economic downturn in the late 2000s, however, moved the focus 
to domestic fiscal issues. The watershed moment came in 2011, as the federal 
government was in danger of surpassing the debt ceiling and experienced an 
unprecedented downgrade of its credit rating by Standard & Poor’s. Congress passed the 
BCA that same year, which called for reducing the Defense Department’s budget by $487 
billion from 2013 to 2021. Automatic reductions, in the form of sequestration, were also 
written into the language; this sequestration would be triggered if Congress could not 
reach the deficit reduction goal set forth in the act (Department of Defense, 2013). 
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The PPBE process is bureaucratically complex so scarce financial resources are 
distributed in the most effective manner possible. Whereas the requirements and 
acquisition processes have been quick to adapt to the rapid pace of technological 
development, budgeting has remained unchanged since the Vietnam War (Department of 
Defense, 2013). The time-consuming process of obtaining funding has worked to the 
detriment of afloat IT capability. Ultimately, the greatest challenge for CANES is the 
installation of the system. The postwar reduction of funding, specifically in O&M, has 
caused a scheduling bottleneck which has no immediate solution.  
D. FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Business Process Reengineering 
The budgeting process is complex, requiring many approvals and compliance 
reviews. Responsibility for a coherent and executable budget not only runs across 
multiple services but also several federal government agencies, such as the OMB. An 
“as-is” model could provide insight into redundant administrative processes. Redesigning 
the process using IT knowledge value added in a “to-be” model could reduce the time 
required to produce a budget. A more agile budget process could, in turn, help to align 
the Navy’s IT acquisition timeline closer to that of its industry partners (GAO, 1997) 
2. Opportunity Cost of Current Acquisition Strategy  
Moore’s Law and its various repurposed claims have driven the strategies of the 
commercial sector for decades. Many Navy IT systems, however, continue to be 
composed of a patchwork of unsupported legacy software and proprietary technology 
because of the inefficiencies in the acquisition process. Competition and innovation 
generally drive up performance and drive down prices (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
2012). The opportunity costs that occur as this gap widens could be analyzed in the 
context of time or money.  
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3. Long-Term Effects of Deficit-Driven Budgeting on Future 
Information Systems 
The second- and third-order effects of a postwar deficit-driven budget strategy are 
yet to be seen. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review dedicates an entire chapter to the 
possible ramifications of budget reductions and sequestration, bluntly stating, “Cuts to 
meet these budget levels would slash force structure and modernization too deeply to 
viably execute our defense strategy” (Department of Defense, 2014). Information 
technology consolidation efforts like CANES and the Joint Information Environment 
could be face further delays. 
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APPENDIX A. OTHER PROCUREMENT DON FY 2014 
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APPENDIX B. RDT&E DON FY 2014 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET 
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